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"CONSECUTIVE" CHAPTER 11 FILINGS:
USE OR ABUSE?
I. Introduction
A "consecutive" Chapter 11 petition means that a debtor's busi-
ness has failed a second time. Twice a victim of cash short-falls or
some other unforeseen contingency, the debtor returns to the sanctu-
ary of the bankruptcy court unable to comply with the obligations
established in a first reorganization plan.2 For example, a debtor files
for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"). 3 The
bankruptcy court subsequently confirms the debtor's reorganization
plan. After "substantial consummation," 4 the debtor defaults on the
plan's financial obligations and the creditors take action to liquidate
the debtor's assets. Rather than undergo liquidation under Chapter
7,5 the debtor halts creditors' efforts to foreclose on collateral a sec-
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1100-74 (1979). The Bankruptcy Code was enacted as the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), on November 6,
1978, and most provisions became effective on October 1, 1979.
The Supreme Court held the Bankruptcy Reform Act to be unconstitutional in North-
ern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). That case held that the
Bankruptcy Reform Act conferred the judicial power of the United States upon judges
who were appointed for only 14 years and who had no protection against a diminution in
salary, in contravention of the constitutional requirement that judges exercising such
power be appointed for life and that their salaries not be reduced. U.S. Const. art. III.
In response, many district courts adopted emergency rules under which Bankruptcy
matters were referred by the district courts to bankruptcy judges for determination, sub-
ject to review by the district court. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Rules for the Southern District
of New York (McKinney's New York Rules of Court 1983).
The Code and related provisions were amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). That Act
amends 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) to provide that the district courts have original and
exclusive jurisdiction under title 11, the Bankruptcy Code. A new chapter 6 of title 28 of
the United State Code is also created, providing for the appointment of bankruptcy
judges, who are given authority to hear and determine certain proceedings under Chapter
11 upon reference by the district court, and subject to review by the district court. 28
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158. By vesting jurisdiction in the district courts and limiting the role of
bankruptcy judge, the constitutional objection is obviated.
2. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Govern-
ance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKRUPTCY DE-
VELOPMENTS JOURNAL 1, 2-5 (1989).
3. Corporations in economic straits often seek refuge in Chapter 11 pursuant to I I
U.S.C. § 1101-74. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 947-56 (1990). The filing of a bankruptcy petition
stops creditors from pursuing their claims. The debtor is given a breathing period to file a
plan of reorganization which changes the capital structure of the firm. Id.
4. See infra note 97.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 701-66. See LAWRENCE KING, 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 700.1
(1987). "Chapter 7 is the 'operative' chapter of the Bankruptcy Code which governs liqui-
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ond time by filing a consecutive Chapter 11 petition. The filing of the
second petition reimposes the automatic stay.6
The national average of confirmed plans over a five year period in
the late 1980s remained relatively constant at 10 percent of Chapter
11 petitions filed.7 This low success rate creates a suspicion that a
percentage of these petitions might have been found, on closer exami-
nation, to be candidates for dismissal as "bad faith" filings.8 Alterna-
tively, conversion to Chapter 7 would have enabled creditors to avoid
the costs of a second bankruptcy petition and to receive a higher frac-
tional percentage on their claims.9 While further consuming an es-
tate's assets, a consecutive petition can allow a debtor to change the
creditor priorities established in a first case.
The problem for creditors is that a second bankruptcy results in a
second petition date creating a second set of priorities.' 0 Generally,
administrative priority claims arise from postpetition services, neces-
sary to maintain a bankruptcy estate. To create an incentive for third
parties to provide services and to participate in a bankruptcy reorgan-
ization, the Code provides that claims necessary to maintain an estate
will be entitled to an administrative priority." With a second peti-
tion, a first petition's administrative priority claims become unsecured
dation of a debtor. Liquidation is a form of relief afforded by the bankruptcy laws which
involves the collection, liquidation, and distribution of the property of the debtor and
culminates in the discharge of the liquidation debtor." Id. at 700-01.
6. See In re Jones, 105 B.R. 1007, 1012 (N.D. Ala. 1989) ("The main effect of a
consecutive filing is to achieve a continuing reimposition of the automatic stay, thereby
delaying the exercise of creditors' rights against their collateral. On occasion, serial filings
attempt to circumvent the appeal process.").
7. Hon. Edith H. Jones, The Good Faith Requirement in Bankruptcy, 1988 ANN.
SURVEY OF BANKR. LAW 45, 46.
8. Id. See also H. Miles Cohn, Good Faith and the Single-Asset Debtor, 62 AMERI-
CAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL 131 (1988). "Though seldom defined, 'good faith' was
a prominent feature of all reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
which either by statute or by judicial interpretation required the debtor to act in good
faith as a predicate for the filing of a petition and for the confirmation of a plan." Id.
9. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507 & 503(b). Unsecured creditors are most likely to bear the
cost of any bankruptcy proceeding. The cost of a debtor's attorney, committees, account-
ants, and all other entities that benefit a bankruptcy estate receive a first priority. Pursu-
ant to § 507, all of their claims will be satisfied before prepetition unsecured claims. In
addition to delay, a consecutive Chapter 11 brings a second round of priority expenses,
further diminishing the assets available to satisfy unsecured claims.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)(b). A debtor's estate, consisting of all legal and equitable
interests, is measured on the filing date. This filing date serves as the cleavage point in
determining which creditors will be entitled to a priority claim.
Generally, unsecured claims arising before a petition receive no priority, while claims
arising after the petition that are "actual and necessary expenses" of a bankruptcy estate,
receive an administrative priority.
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
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because these claims arose prior to the second filing date and are not
necessary to maintain the second estate.
In contrast to a consecutive Chapter 11, this problem does not
arise where a reorganization fails and the court converts the case to
Chapter 7. By providing for the "effect of conversion," the Bank-
ruptcy Code protects a first petition's administrative priority claims
by stating that the first petition date will serve as the only petition
date and that conversion "[d]oes not effect a change in the date of the
filing of the petition,. "2 The absence of similar provisions gov-
erning creditor's rights in consecutive Chapter 11 petitions leaves a
first petition's administrative priority creditors unprotected and may
suggest that Congress never intended debtors to use a consecutive
Chapter 11 as a liquidation mechanism. At least one commentator
has criticized consecutive Chapter I I filings and stated: "[d]espite the
Seventh Circuit's holding, it is not clear that the Code by its terms
permits serial filings.""
To date, a paucity of cases have dealt with consecutive Chapter 11
filings. In these cases, the courts have split as to whether consecutive
filings constitute grounds for dismissal and have applied inconsistent
filing standards.14 A recent surge in consecutive Chapter 11 cases
suggests that the problem is growing. The threat of a geometric
growth in the use of consecutive Chapter 11 petitions is apparent from
the blossoming in the use of consecutive Chapter 1315 filings. 16 In
considering whether a debtor has filed a consecutive Chapter 13 peti-
tion in good faith, a number of courts have perceived consecutive
Chapter 13 petitions to be an abuse of the bankruptcy system, upset-
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 348(a).
13. Benjamin Weintraub & Michael J. Crames, Defining Consummation, Effective
Date Of Plan Of Reorganization And Retention Of Postconfirmation Jurisdiction: Sug-
gested Amendments to Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules 64 AM. BANK. L.J. 245,
274 (1990).
14. In re Casa Loma Assocs,, 122 B.R. 814, 815 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991). See, e.g.,
In re Jartran, 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989); Official Committee of the Unsecured Credi-
tors of White Farm Equipment Company v. United States, 20 B.C.D. 190 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (The cases permitted debtors to file consecutive Chapter 11 petitions.). But see In
re AT of Maine, Inc., 56 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985); In re Northampton Corp., 39
B.R. 955 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (dismissing the debtors' consecutive "Chapter 1 I" peti-
tions citing the good faith requirement in bankruptcy).
15. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1330. LAWRENCE KING, 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1300-
18, § 1300.02 (15th ed 1987). "Chapter 13 is designed to facilitate adjustments of the
debts of individuals with regular income through extension and composition plans funded
out of future income, under the protection of the court." Id.
16. A Lexis 1991 search produced over fifty cases that discuss consecutive filings in
Chapter 13 bankruptcies.
1991]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ting the balance between debtors' and creditors' rights.' 7
The only circuit to address consecutive Chapter 11 filings was the
Seventh Circuit in Jartran, Inc.." This 1989 case took a liberal view
towards consecutive filings that may have encouraged Chapter 11
debtors to utilize this novel tactic. 9 This view departs from earlier
precedent which may be interpreted as a per se holding that serial
Chapter 11 petitions are not permitted.21 While recognizing an inher-
ent unfairness associated with consecutive filings, a third line of cases
imposes a more restrictive good faith standard that permits consecu-
tive Chapter 11 filings under limited circumstances.2'
Courts recognize that consecutive filings necessitate repeated court
appearances, involve lost time in foreclosing on collateral, result in
lost interest, and threaten creditor priority positions. In light of these
problems, this Note argues that: bankruptcy courts should apply a
good faith standard that imposes a higher level of scrutiny before per-
mitting a debtor to proceed with a second filing and plan.22 Part II of
this Note analyzes the good faith standards for consecutive Chapter
11 petitions established in different jurisdictions. Part III focuses on
the threat consecutive petitions pose to the Bankruptcy Code's lease
and executory contract provisions. Part IV analyzes how consecutive
filings can undermine the Code's basic creditor protections. The Note
concludes that courts should apply a rigorous good faith standard
17. See In re Jones, 105 B.R. 1007, 1012. (N.D. Ala. 1989) (The court contrasts
Chapter 20's (7 + 13) with Chapter 26's (13 + 13), commenting that lawyers in some juris-
dictions may now be guilty of malpractice if they do not employ the Chapter 20 device
because the practice has become so common.).
18. In re Jartran, 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989).
19. Id. at 860 (The Seventh Circuit perceived this tactic to be a novel approach for a
corporate debtor. "In this case we are asked to determine the novel question of the pro-
priety of serial Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings."). See also Official Comm. of the Un-
secured Creditors of White Farm Equipment Co. v. United States, 20 B.C.D. 190 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (following the Seventh Circuit and becoming the second court to permit a
consecutive filing).
20. See In re Casa Loma Assocs., 122 B.R. 814, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (discuss-
ing In re AT of Maine, Inc., 56 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985); In re Northampton Corp.,
39 B.R. 955. (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)).
21. See, e.g., In re Casa Loma Assocs., 122 B.R. at 818; In re Garsal Realty, Inc., 98
B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
22. The good faith issue will often be raised by the parties but the court may raise and
act on the issue sua sponte. See Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mort. Corp.,
779 F.2d 1068, 1071 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The parties agree that the bankruptcy court
has the power to raise the issue of good faith sua sponte as an inquiry into its jurisdiction,
and former Bankruptcy Act precedent in this circuit confirms their position."). See also
In re Metro. Realty Corp., 433 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1008
(1971); S. Land Tile Corp. v. Mitchell, 375 F.2d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 1967) ("As soon as the
lack of good faith affirmatively appeared, the district court acted properly in dismissing
the petition even though the plan stage had not been reached.").
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consistent with recent decisions from the Northern Districts of Geor-
gia2 3 and New York.24  As illustrated by these decisions, an ex-
traordinary change of circumstance or a strong indication that a
debtor has a realistic reorganization prospect represent the limited
circumstances under which a second Chapter 11 should be
permissible.
II. Background On Consecutive Chapter 11 Petitions
A. Bankruptcy's General Good Faith Requirement
Judge Edith H. Jones of the Fifth Circuit has described good faith
as the "gatekeeper of the equity court."" As courts of equity, bank-
ruptcy courts have the power to interfere with contracts, delay and
reduce the payment of debts, prevent employees from receiving timely
wages and benefits, defer compliance with environmental regulations,
and have an adverse effect on consumer protection.2 6 Because a bank-
ruptcy court's door is open to anyone who satisfies the Code's defini-
tion of insolvency, "not generally paying his debts as they come
due,"27 the burden often falls on bankruptcy judges to uphold the in-
tegrity of the bankruptcy system by dismissing petitions filed in bad
faith.
An unwarranted bankruptcy petition is not a victimless matter. 2
Bad faith cases crowd out good Title 11 cases by the often dispropor-
tionate amount of judicial attention that must be devoted to them*29
One can speculate that a large number of bad faith cases will inevita-
bly drive up the cost of credit transactions and disadvantage partici-
pants in the credit economy.3°
Since the Code's enactment in 1978, courts have employed various
good faith requirements to prevent the maintenance of cases with no
possibility of reorganization that were filed with the intent to delay
and harass creditors.31 Although section 1129(a)(3) contains the only
23. Casa Loma, 122 B.R. at 818.
24. Garsal, 98 B.R. at 150.
25. Jones, supra note 7, at 45.
26. Id.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 101(3 1)(C)(i) defines insolvent as: "generally not paying debts as they
come become due...".
28. Jones, supra note 7, at 45.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc., 709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st Cir. 1983); In re
Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Ca. 1982). Findings of lack of good faith in
proceedings based on § 362(d) or 1112(b) have been predicated on certain recurring but
non-exclusive patterns, and they are based on a conglomerate of factors rather than on
any single datum.
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explicit good faith requirement in Title 11, good faith issues surface
throughout the Code including: challenges to a debtor's filing, the
hurdle in creditors' motions for relief from stay, and good faith as
prescribed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.32 In
section 1129, good faith is a standard for plan confirmation. This
standard is related, but not identical to, the "good faith" required in
filing for bankruptcy relief.33 Pursuant to this section, a court may
not confirm a plan unless the debtor satisfies all elements of section
1129 including subsection (a)(3), that "the plan has been proposed in
good faith." 34
In developing good faith standards, courts have emphasized differ-
ent factors in determining whether a debtor has acted in bad faith.
For example, the First and Seventh Circuits have articulated a test
that questions whether a Chapter 11 plan is reasonably likely to
achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the
Code.35
In Madison Hotel Associates, 36 the debtor, Madison Hotel Associ-
ates ("MHA"), asserted that the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin (the "District Court") construed section
1129(a)(3)'s good faith requirement too narrowly. The Seventh Cir-
cuit agreed with the debtor and found that the District Court erred in
its definition of good faith. The court held that under section
1129(a)(3), a court should look to the circumstances surrounding the
debtor's plan and should review a proposed plan for accuracy and "a
fundamental fairness in dealing with one's creditors. ' 37 The court
noted that the bankruptcy judge is in the best position to assess the
good faith of the parties' proposals and that, in this case, the judge
had held three separate evidentiary hearings concerning the feasibility
of MHA's plan. The Seventh Circuit found several additional facts
relevant to its finding that the debtor proposed his plan in good faith.
32. Bankruptcy Rule 9011 makes Rule 11 applicable to bankruptcy proceedings. Pur-
suant to Rule 11, an attorney's signature represents that the pleading is well grounded in
fact and warranted by law and that it is not motivated by an improper purpose; i.e. to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay. See In re French Gardens, Ltd. 58 B.R. 959, 964
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (Court found a filing to prevent foreclosure with no hope of
reorganization to be abusive.).
33. See In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversing the
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin for failing to make the legal distinc-
tion between the good faith that is required to confirm a plan under § 1129(a)(3) and the
good faith that has been established as a prerequisite to filing a Chapter II petition for
reorganization).
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
35. See In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc., 709 F.2d 762, 765 (1st Cir.1983).
36. 749 F.2d 410, 425.
37. Id. (quoting In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426, 432-33 (7th Cir. 1982)).
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These included findings that: the plan called for full payment of all
creditors; all creditors, with one exception, affirmatively accepted the
plan; and the plan would enable MHA to continue as a viable entity
in accord with the purposes of Chapter 11.38
While the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of section 1129(a)(3)'s
good faith requirement focused on fairness to creditors, the First Cir-
cuit defined good faith as consistency with Chapter 1l's objective of
"resuscitating a financially troubled corporation. ' 39 Presumably, a
debtor whose plan presents no reasonable likelihood of reorganization
will not overcome this good faith hurdle. Decided under the old
Bankruptcy Act, Gonzalez Hernandez v. Borgos4 demonstrates a re-
organization plan whose objective conflicted with sound reasons of
public policy.4" Looking at all the circumstances, the First Circuit
determined that Mr. Borgos' plan sought to place his assets beyond
the reach of his dependent children. Citing the principles of good
conscience, the court stated that a plan which disables a debtor from
meeting obligations can hardly be regarded as having been proposed
in good faith.42
The Second Circuit formulated a different good faith standard by
adding an "honesty and good intentions" prong to the requirement
that a debtor have a "[b]asis for expecting that a reorganization can
be effected."43 As applied, this standard focuses on full disclosure and
ulterior motives as basic issues to be considered under section
1129(a)(3). 44 In Koelbl v. Glessing,45 the test included an inquiry into
the debtor's conduct to ascertain any evidence of dishonesty and to
determine whether the purpose in filing a Chapter 11 was to hinder or
delay secured creditors.46
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., B.M. Brite v. Sun Country Dev., Inc., 764 F.2d 406,.408 (5th Cir. 1985);
In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
The Fifth Circuit has advocated a similar good faith standard. See Jasik v. Conrad,
727 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1984) The Fifth Circuit stated that a reorganization plan
must be "viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances" surrounding confirmation
of the plan. The court's standard necessitates that a plan be "proposed with the legiti-
mate and honest purpose to reorganize and present a reasonable hope of success," to
satisfy § 1129(a)(3)'s good faith requirement. Id. at 1383. See also Public Finance Corp.
v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1983).
40. 343 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1965).
41. Id. at 805.
42. Id. at 806.
43. See Koelbl v. Glessing, 751 F.2d 137, 139 (2nd Cir. 1984).
44. Id. See also In re Weathersfeld Farms, Inc., 14 B.R. 572, 574 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1981) (Bankruptcy cannot be used to thwart foreclosure).
45. 751 F.2d at 137.
46. Id. at 139.
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The policies behind the good faith requirement promote a balance
of interests between debtor and creditor.47 These policies are particu-
larly important with consecutive bankruptcy filings, where the injury
to creditors is likely to be more acute by virtue of having to live
through the bankruptcy process twice. The Fifth Circuit has stated
that non-debtor parties bear the burden of repeated court appear-
ances, lost interest on capital, and the need to absorb a second round
of administrative expenses-including the cost of debtor's counsel.4"
With consecutive Chapter 11 petitions, courts have proposed different
levels of scrutiny in formulating their good faith definitions.
B. The Seventh Circuit's Liberal Good Faith Standard as Applied
to Consecutive Filings
When a debtor proposes a consecutive Chapter 11 petition, two
principal issues arise: (i) whether the debtor filed the consecutive plan
in good faith and (ii) whether the consecutive plan can change the
priority structure established in the first plan.49 The Bankruptcy
Courts for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Northampton and
for the District of Maine in AT of Maine answered both questions
negatively and dismissed consecutive Chapter 11 petitions. 0 In con-
trast, the Seventh Circuit answered both questions affirmatively. 5
In becoming the first jurisdiction to permit a debtor to file a consec-
utive Chapter 11 petition, the Seventh Circuit in Jartran advocated a
permissive good faith standard that appeared to fall short of the
stricter general good faith analysis applied by other United States
Courts of Appeal. 2 As discussed in the previous section, good faith
47. In Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. 779 F.2d 1068, 1072
(5th Cir. 1986), the Fifth Circuit summarized these policies:
[g]ood faith prevents abuse of the bankruptcy process by debtors whose overrid-
ing motive is to delay creditors without benefitting them in any way or to
achieve reprehensible purposes. Moreover, a good faith standard protects the
jurisdictional integrity of the bankruptcy courts by rendering their powerful eq-
uitable weapons (i.e. avoidance of liens, discharge of debts, marshalling and
turnover of assets) available only to those debtors and creditors with 'clean
hands.'
Id.
48. Id.
49. Priorities in bankruptcy enable special types of unsecured creditors to receive pay-
ment before other classes of unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 507 specifies the kinds of
claims that are entitled to administrative priority in distribution.
50. ATof Maine, 56 B.R. 55; Northampton, 39 B.R. 955. See infra notes 90-108 and
accompanying text.
51. In re Jartran, 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989); Official Comm. of the Unsecured
Creditors of White Farm Equip. Co. v. United States, 20 B.C.D. 190 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
52. See supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.
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requires that a court scrutinize a debtor's honesty and motives, while
considering whether the result is consistent with the Bankruptcy
Code's policies and statutory scheme.
The Jartran case began with the 1981 bankruptcy of Jartran, Inc.
("Jartran"), a company that rented and leased trucks on a nationwide
basis." The court confirmed Jartran's fifth amended plan of reorgani-
zation on September 29, 1984 (Jartran 1).'4 Approximately one and a
half years later, the reorganized Jartran filed a second Chapter 11 pe-
tition, this time with the aim of liquidating rather than reorganizing
the company (Jartran I1).55 Fruehauf Corporation ("Fruehauf"), a
creditor under the original Chapter 11 plan, argued that this second
Chapter 11 filing was improper and should be dismissed. 6 In the al-
ternative, Fruehauf argued that if a second filing were permissible
Fruehauf should retain its administrative priority" recognized by the
debtor's original plan.58
The bankruptcy court rejected Fruehauf's assertions 9 and the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that the Bankruptcy Code con-
tains no explicit limitation on consecutive Chapter 11 filings. 60 The
court reasoned that "serial Chapter 11 filings are permissible under
the Code if filed in good faith, as are liquidating Chapter 11 plans. '61
53. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 861.
54. See In re Jartran, 71 B.R. 938, 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987). Fruehauf's claim
against Jartran totaled $54,700,000 and was to be discharged through monthly payments
from Jartran to Fruehauf of $200,000 per month for 72 months plus a lump sum to be
paid at confirmation. Id. at 939-40.
55. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 860-61.
56. Id. at 861.
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 503. See also United Trucking Service v. Trailer Rental Co. (In
re United Trucking Serv.), 851 F.2d 159, 19 C.B.C.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1988) The claim
arose from the debtor's postpetition use of leased equipment allegedly in violation of the
terms of the prepetition agreement. To qualify a claim as an administrative expense
under § 503, the claim must arise after the bankruptcy filing from a service that benefits
the bankruptcy estate. In contrast to a postpetition expense, claims that arise prepetition
are treated as general unsecured claims rather than as an administrative expense. The
claims' amount reflected the actual value conferred on the bankruptcy estate by reason of
wrongful acts or breach of agreement.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 355 (1977). The provision specifies
the kinds of administrative expenses that are allowable in a case under the Bankruptcy
Code. The section provides: "The actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the com-
mencement of the case, and any taxes on, measured by, or withheld from such wages,
salaries, or commissions, are allowable as administrative expenses." The subsection is
derived mainly from § 64a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. Id.
58. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 861.
59. Jartran, 71 B.R. 938 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
60. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 867 (discussing the good faith requirement on all Chapter I 1
filings).
61. Id.
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Unlike section 109(g), 62 which imposes a 180 day limit on the filing of
consecutive Chapter 13 petitions, the Bankruptcy Code imposes no
parallel temporal limitation on Chapter 11 filings.63 In the absence of
explicit limitations, the circuit court reasoned that Congress, had they
wished, could have easily included a limitation on a Chapter 11
debtor's right to file a congecutive petition. 64The Jartran court's conclusion that "it is equally clear that the pro-
visions of the Code permit the arrangement at issue here" is not self-
evident.65 In fact, the court's general reference to the Bankruptcy
Code and to the Sinclair66 decision do not support its holding that
consecutive petitions are permissible. Disagreeing with the Seventh
Circuit's broad language advocating consecutive filings, one commen-
tator has observed that: "The statement that serial Chapter 11 filings
are permissible under the Code is not supported by any section of the
Code...,,67 Similarly, the Sinclair decision appears to be erroneously
cited by the Seventh Circuit. That decision did not involve consecu-
tive Chapter 11 petitions and instead focused on how a court should
proceed when the Code conflicts with its legislative history. 68
The fundamental concern to be addressed in a good faith analysis is
that creditors be treated equitably and that the bankruptcy system's
integrity be upheld.69 Concluding that Congress did not intend to bar
debtors from filing consecutive Chapter 11 petitions, the court in Jar-
tran went on to discuss the good faith issue.70 The Seventh Circuit
defined "good faith" broadly to include filings even where they "cir-
cumvent protections generally afforded creditors under the Code's
provisions for failed reorganizations. 71  This enigmatic standard
seems to contradict itself. In Jartran, the court permitted a consecu-
tive filing to reduce the largest creditor's administrative claim and to
circumvent a well established creditor protection. In spite of this re-
sult, the Seventh Circuit pronounced Jartran's second plan to be "eq-
uitable," justifying it as a "good faith" admission that Jartran was
unable to continue operating as a going concern. 72 However, conver-
62. 11 U.S.C. § 109(g).
63. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 869-70.
64. Id. at 870.
65. Id. at 866.
66. 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989).
67. Weintraub & Crames, supra note 13, at 273.
68. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1341.
69. See supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.
70. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (imposing a good faith requirement for confirmation of
a Chapter 11 plan).
71. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 870.
72. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 868.
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sion to Chapter 7 would have provided an equally viable means to
liquidate Jartran that would not have circumvented this creditor pro-
tection.73 A belief that conversion would raise a myriad of complex
issues that would be "mind-boggling" motivated the court to opt for a
new Chapter 11 rather than to convert the case.74 However, the com-
plexity relates to jurisdictional issues that could be cured by including
a plan provision providing that the first court retain jurisdiction
should the debtor default."
In 1989, a second case from the same jurisdiction followed Jar-
tran.76 The circumstances in this case of a failed reorganization and a
consecutive filing that impaired a priority claim were strikingly simi-
lar to those in Jartran.77 At stake in White Farm Equipment Com-
pany v. United States,78 was an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
priority tax claim that had been established in the first Chapter 11
filing.
In White Farm, the bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor's first
amended reorganization plan in 198 1.79 A provision in the initial plan
provided that all claims made by governmental units, including the
IRS, would be completely satisfied in six years by equal annual install-
ments. 80 After five years of sporadic plan payments, a creditor forced
the debtor into bankruptcy by filing an involuntary Chapter 7. The
bankruptcy court noted that "very little, if any, of the claim of the
IRS for withholding taxes was paid subsequent to the reorganiza-
tion." Protecting the IRS tax lien, the bankruptcy court found that
its priority status survived a consecutive filing.82
On appeal to the district court, the issue was whether the debtor's
second Chapter 11 could alter the IRS's priority claim. 3 Relying on
Jartran, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court and permit-
ted the debtor to file a consecutive petition, diminishing the IRS's
claim to general unsecured status.8 4 Citing the Jartran decision, the
court stated:
73. Id.
74. Weintraub & Crames, supra note 13, at 275.
75. Id. (discussing the jurisdictional problems that arise when a debtor defaults on a
substantially consummated plan).
76. In re White Farm Equip. Co., 103 B.R. 177 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
77. Id. at 178.
78. 111 B.R. 158 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
79. Id. at 159.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 160.
82. 103 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
83. White Farm, 111 B.R. at 159.
84. Id. at 162.
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The provisions of a confirmed plan bind all parties whose rights are
affected by the plan... when, as here, substantial operations under
a confirmed plan are followed by a second case, the entity's unpaid
liabilities under the first plan become general unsecured claims in
the second case.85
The White Farm opinion broadened the definition of when a con-
secutive Chapter 11 petition is proper, as articulated in the Jartran
case. While Jartran permitted a consecutive Chapter 11 petition for
the limited purpose of liquidating a failed debtor,86 the district court
in White Farm placed no similar limitation on the use of consecutive
Chapter 11 petitions.87 In allowing a consecutive Chapter 11 petition
to impair a priority claim,8 the court's liberal good faith standard
permits a consecutive Chapter 11 even where the result is unlikely to
further the Congressional policy of creditor cooperation in bank-
ruptcy reorganizations.8 9
C. Jurisdictions Suggesting that Consecutive Petitions are Bad
Faith Per Se
Two bankruptcy courts have advocated an opposing view that sug-
gests that consecutive Chapter 11 petitions are bad faith per se.9
While these courts do not purport to establish a per se rule, a subse-
quent opinion has stated these decisions could be interpreted as sup-
porting the view that a consecutive Chapter 11 petition is bad faith
per se. 91
Applying a strict standard, the District of Maine's Bankruptcy
Court rejected a debtor's attempt to file a consecutive Chapter 11 peti-
85. Id. (quoting In re Jartran, 76 B.R. 123, 125 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987)).
86. Jartran, 886 F.2d 859, 870 (7th Cir. 1989).
87. White Farm, 111 B.R. 158 (N.D. Ill 1990) (permitting a consecutive chapter 11
petition with a goal of reorganizing rather than liquidating, suggesting that consecutive
Chapter 11 filings are appropriate in a broader set of circumstances).
88. Id. at 160-61 (The court acknowledged that § 507(a)(7) entitled the I.R.S. to pri-
ority status in the first plan of reorganization. However, the court argued that the Bank-
ruptcy Code intended to treat the individual debtor differently from the corporate debtor.
Because § 523 states that tax obligations are excepted from discharge for individuals, the
court reasoned that tax obligations must be dischargeable for non-individual debtors or
§ 523 becomes a nullity; "if the drafters thought that the I.R.S. would never lose its
priority over an unpaid tax claim because of the provisions of § 507, then it would not be
necessary, to prohibit discharge to individual debtors.").
89. See infra note 187.
90. See In re AT of Maine, Inc., 56 B.R. 55, 58 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985); In re North-
ampton Corp., 39 B.R. 955, 956 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984) (These courts viewed a second
Chapter 11 petition as fundamentally unfair to the unsecured and secured creditors. The
inequity stemmed from the fact that the second plan altered creditors' rights established
by a previously consummated plan of reorganization.).
91. In re Casa Loma Assocs., 122 B.R. 814, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
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tion.9 2 In A T of Maine, the debtor, AT of Maine, Inc., together with
its affiliate, American Trawler Corporation, filed a voluntary Chapter
11 petition in 1981. 9' The court confirmed the debtor's consolidated
reorganization plan in 1982. 91 The requirements of the confirmed
plan included: the transfer of property between the consolidated cor-
porations, the allowance of monthly claims, plus the payment of a
sum of money to be distributed pro rata.95 Subsequently, the debtor
was unable to make payments on the first confirmed plan and at-
tempted to file a consecutive petition in 1985.96
The court's "good faith" definition focused on a perceived conflict
between the consecutive petition and the language of the Bankruptcy
Code. The court found that the debtor's first reorganization plan was
"substantially consummated." '97 Citing the Bankruptcy Code's bar
against modifying a substantially consummated plan, the court per-
ceived AT of Maine's second plan to be a vehicle to modify and to
avoid the obligations established by the first Chapter 11 plan.98 Be-
cause a consecutive petition will inevitably modify a first petition's
obligations, the court's ruling that AT of Maine's second Chapter 11
petition was not filed in good faith would appear to bar consecutive
Chapter 11 petitions.99
In Northampton,1" the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania reached a similar result. The court found that the
filing of the second petition was tantamount to modifying the previous
plan after substantial consummation and reasoned that to hold other-
wise would be to "allow (a) debtor to continuously circumvent the
provisions of a confirmed plan by filing Chapter 11 petitions ad infin-
itum."101 In this case, the debtor filed a first Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion petition in 1981.102 The confirmed plan required the payment of
92. ATof Maine, 56 B.R. at 58.
93. Id. at 56.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) defines "substantial consummation" as:
(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to be
transferred;
(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan
of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property
dealt with by the plan; and
(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.
98. ATof Maine, 56 B.R. at 58.
99. Id.
100. In re Northampton, 39 B.R. 955 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
101. In re Northampton, 37 B.R. 110, 112-13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
102. Northampton, 39 B.R. at 956.
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a $2,000,000 claim to Manufacturers Hanover ("Hanover") by April
28, 1983.103 Hanover's claim arose from mortgage loans."' When
the debtor failed to meet repayment deadlines, Hanover initiated fore-
closure proceedings. 105 To stop the foreclosure, the debtor sought to
reimpose the automatic stay by filing a second Chapter 11 petition." 6
The court concluded that the debtor was not acting in good faith"0 7
since he was "attempting to use the Chapter 11 proceeding predomi-
nantly for the purpose of affecting the claims of Hanover and other
creditors which were unsuccessfully addressed in the confirmed plan
in the prior Chapter 11 proceeding,... "18
D. Jurisdictions Advocating a Middle Position by Applying a
More Rigorous Good Faith Standard
While agreeing with Jartran's holding that consecutive petitions are
permissible, a number of courts require additional justification for a
debtor's second filing. 109 These courts have opted to limit consecutive
filings to circumstances where a debtor has both acted in good faith
and where the second petition results from "unforeseen or changed
circumstances."10
For example, in Garsal Realty, Inc., "'the court discussed the stan-
dards under which a consecutive Chapter 11 filing would be permissi-
ble. The court advocated a rigorous facts and circumstances analysis
"to ascertain a valid reorganization purpose consistent with a debtor's
realit[ies]." ' z The case involved a sixty unit apartment complex en-
cumbered by a $1,382,388 mortgage. 13 After filing for Chapter 11
relief and substantially consummating the first plan, the debtor de-
faulted and filed a second plan."' The mortgagee sought relief from
stay or alternatively to dismiss the second filing on the grounds that
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (automatic stay enjoins creditors from removing property
from a bankruptcy estate).
107. See Northampton, 39 B.R. at 956 (recognizing the two cases to be substantially
similar. In both cases, the debtors sought to modify a previously confirmed Chapter 11
plan after confirmation).
108. Id. ("since we stated that these claims may not now be affected or modified by
the current Chapter 11 case, we conclude that "cause" under § 1112(b) is present.").
109. See, e.g., In re Casa Loma Assocs., 122 B.R. 814, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In
re Garsal Realty, Inc., 98 B.R. 140, 150 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
110. Casa Loma, 122 B.R. at 818.
111. Garsal, 98 B.R. 140.
112. Id. at 151.
113. Id. at 143.
114. Id. at 144.
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the debtor had acted in bad faith."'5
As a preliminary matter, the Garsal court noted that the debtor
incurred most of the debts listed in the second petition after the first
plan's substantial consummation date. 1 6 While agreeing with the
Jartran decision that a consecutive filing alone is not grounds for dis-
missal, the court required an additional test by mandating that a
debtor undergo a "bona fide change in circumstances" to justify
"multiple filings."' 17 In this case, the changed circumstances in-
cluded an increased debt load, unforeseen levels of tenant vacancy
sparked by a drop in interest rates which encouraged home buyers,
and the closing of a nearby company that had provided a tenant
source. 1 8 Consistent with general good faith principles, the court
stated that a good faith inquiry should focus on: "whether or not
there was a pattern or strategy behind the filings to frustrate statutory
requirements and abuse the bankruptcy process." '19
This more rigorous good faith requirement was subsequently up-
held by a second jurisdiction in a bankruptcy also involving an apart-
ment complex owned by a partnership. In Casa Loma Associates,1 20 a
default in the first Chapter 11 plan precipitated a second filing. Fol-
lowing the Garsal opinion, the court elaborated on the changed cir-
cumstances that could "warrant a second filing."1 21 As a principle,
the court stated: "relying merely on changed market conditions" is
not enough to support a consecutive filing. 12  However, in Casa
Loma, an unanticipated change in federal law and the discovery of
fire damage and structural defects, unknown at the time of consum-
mation of the debtor's first plan, substantially affected the debtor's
ability to perform under the plan.' 23 Turning to the good faith issue,
the court commented that the creditor had failed to demonstrate the
factors necessary to support dismissal as a bad faith filing. In addi-
tion, the "[d]ebtor appear[ed] to have a reasonable prospect of suc-
cessful reorganization." 124
The more rigorous good faith standard requires both that a debtor
act in good faith and undergo an unanticipated change in circum-
115. Id. at 143.
116. Id. at 150.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. In re Casa Loma, 122 B.R. 814 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
121. Id. at 818.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 818-19.
124. Id. at 819.
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stances. This stricter definition prevents a debtor from circumventing
creditor protections and requires a compelling justification for sub-
jecting creditors to the delay inherent in a consecutive bankruptcy.
III. Consecutive Chapter 11 Petitions Interfere With Bankruptcy
Code Protections And Policies And Should Be Limited
By A Narrow Good Faith Standard
A. The Impact of Consecutive Chapter 11 Petitions on Leases and
Executory Contracts
A widely accepted definition of a corporation suggests that a corpo-
ration is little more than a nexus of contracts.125 Naturally, contrac-
tual rights play a significant role in corporate reorganizations,
particularly where a debtor's assets include long-term leases and sup-
ply contracts. A debtor's right to assume or reject executory con-
tracts is a well-established debtor privilege. While debtors have a
broad right to assume contracts, the burden of assumption is that a
party to an assumed contract will be entitled to a priority should a
debtor subsequently breach an assumed contract.
Consecutive Chapter 11 petitions threaten the Code's well-estab-
lished treatment of leases and executory contracts by permitting a
debtor to assume a lease while avoiding the burden of assumption.
Unlike the Garsal court's standard, which questions whether a debtor
has a "pattern" or "strategy" to frustrate statutory requirements, the
Jartran decision fails to scrutinize whether the result is consistent
with the Bankruptcy Code and whether the second petition is merely
an attempt to avoid the burden that arose from the debtor's assump-
tion of a contract in a first bankruptcy.
In Jartran, Fruehauf Corporation, a principal creditor, continued
to lease equipment to Jartran in the period following Jartran's first
Chapter 11 petition.126 Fruehauf's original claim against Jartran
arose from Jartran's breach of an assumed lease.127 While Fruehauf's
original claim would have been satisfied as a priority claim if the case
had been converted to Chapter 7, the second Chapter 11 petition
made the status of their claim an issue. The Seventh Circuit estab-
125. See, e.g., McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique
of Eisenberg, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1332 (1990); Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corpo-
ration: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
126. In re Jartran, 886 F.2d 859, 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 365 which permits a debtor to assume or to reject execu-
tory contracts and leases.
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lished that an administrative priority in a first Chapter 11 petition did
not guarantee similar priority treatment in a consecutive case.
To reach this result, the court treated the first and second Chapter
11 petitions as separate and independent cases1 28 advocating a narrow
reading of section 365(g)129 and section 503.130 "Proceeding" in sec-
tion 365(g)(2) was read to exclude Jartran II and "estate" in section
128. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 871.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) states:
Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the rejec-
tion of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a
breach of such contract or lease-
(2) if such contract or lease has been assumed under this section or under a
plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, 12 or 13 of this title-
(A) if before such rejection the case has not yet been converted under §§ 1112,
1307, or 1208 of this title, at the time of such rejection; or
(B) if before such rejection the case has been converted under §§ 1112, 1307,
or 1208 of this title-
(i) immediately before the date of such conversion, if such contract or lease
was assumed before such conversion; or
(ii) at the time of such rejection, if such contract or lease was assumed after
such conversion.
§ 365(g) defines the time at which a rejection of an assumed contract or lease constitutes
a breach. See In re Multech, 47 B.R. 747, 750 (section indicates that the act of assump-
tion creates an administrative expense obligation of the particular proceeding in which
the contract or lease was assumed). See also Jartran, 886 F.2d at 871. The Seventh
Circuit defined "proceeding" narrowly to include a debtor's first petition but not a
debtor's second petition. The court stated: "[w]e are now dealing with Jartran II, and the
leases have not been assumed in this proceeding. Thus § 365(g)(2) is inapplicable on its
face." 886 F.2d at 871. Because Jartran assumed Fruehauf's master lease in Jartran I
rather than Jartran II, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the administrative priority
relates to the first case and not to the second. Id.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 503 dictates that certain costs will be given a special priority as an
administrative expense. Subsection (b) specifies the kinds of administrative expenses that
are allowable in a case under the Bankruptcy Code. The subsection, with some changes,
is derived mainly from § 64a(l) of the Bankruptcy Act. The actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services
rendered are allowable as administrative expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (Historical and Revi-
sion Notes).
In a second statutory argument, Fruehauf claimed that the balance due on the Jartran
I leases, the costs of repossessing equipment, and the balance due on defaulted payments
for lost or stolen vehicles should be treated as administrative expenses. Jartran, 886 F.2d
at 871. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) "permits administrative expense claims for 'the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.'" Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1)(A)). In rejecting this argument, the court drew the same distinction that it
used to reject Fruehauf's § 365(g) argument. Id. Without looking at the factual claim of
whether the costs were necessary or actual, the Seventh Circuit disposed of the argument
stating: "None of these expenses were actual or necessary for preserving the estate in
Jartran II, which was not yet extant." Id.
Fruehauf's final statutory argument again turned to 11 U.S.C. § 503. Fruehauf in-
voked this section to establish its entitlement to an administrative priority for its expenses
incurred in marshalling and repossessing equipment since the filing of Jartran II. The
Court rejected this claim asserting that expenditures "must benefit the estate as a whole
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503(b)(1)(A) was read to exclude Jartran II. Therefore, Fruehauf
could not claim an automatic administrative priority in the second
case simply by pointing to the provisions of the original reorganiza-
tion plan.1 31 Even the court appeared to acknowledge that its holding
would produce the unfortunate consequence of denying creditors an
important bankruptcy protection and stated that: "the Code clearly
by its terms permits serial good faith Chapter 11 filings, even where
the effect is to circumvent protections generally afforded creditors
under the Code's provisions for failed reorganizations."' 132 The Sev-
enth Circuit's result illustrates the conflict between consecutive Chap-
ter 11 petitions and the Code's traditional treatment of executory
contracts and leases that will be discussed in the following section.
B. The Historical Treatment of Assumed Leases
The Bankruptcy Code's treatment of unexpired leases and execu-
tory contracts 33 reflects a long history that can be traced back to
provisions in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. 3  History demonstrates a
legislative and judicial tendency to extend broad protections to parties
that contract with a debtor in the period following a debtor's peti-
rather than just the creditor claimant." Id. at 871. A lessor's act in repossessing vehicles
is generally one of desperation to salvage collateral when a lessor defaults.
The Seventh Circuit characterized Fruehauf's repossession of its leased trailers from
Jartran as a self-serving act. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 870.
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 which governs unexpired leases and executory contracts in
bankruptcy. This section gives a debtor the broad power to assume or to reject an execu-
tory contract or unexpired lease within 60 days of filing a bankruptcy petition and estab-
lishes a principal right for the debtor that is at the heart of bankruptcy reorganizations.
The provision protects a debtor's vital business interests and enables a debtor to reap the
benefits of prepetition contracts that are necessary for it to continue operating its busi-
ness.
While affording the debtor the important right to assume executory contracts and
leases, important creditor's rights flow directly from the debtor's, decision to assume a
contract. The Bankruptcy Code attaches great importance to a debtor's decision to as-
sume an executory contract. The decision entitles the creditor to an administrative prior-
ity should the reorganization fail. As a result, the debtor must carefully decide which
contracts will be assumed and which will be rejected. When an executory contract is not
assumed by the time of confirmation of a plan or conversion of a case, the non-debtor
party is treated as if it had a prepetition claim. A prepetition claim receives no adminis-
trative priority should the debtor's reorganization fail and the debtor liquidate.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 64(a) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act provides:
The debts to have priority, in 'advance of the payment of dividends to creditors,
and to be paid in full out of the bankrupt estates, and the order of payment shall
be (1) the costs and expenses of administration, including the actual and neces-
sary costs and expense of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition.
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tion. M Through administrative priorities designated in section 507,
the Bankruptcy Code gives preferential treatment to specifically de-
fined classes of creditors as a means of furthering important policies
and creating desirable incentives. Priorities in bankruptcy enable one
type of creditor to receive payment before other classes of creditors.
In Jartran, a creditor received a priority designation that was sub-
sequently revoked within a year's time by- the confirmation of the sec-
ond plan.1 36  Jartran's second plan provided for the debtor's
liquidation pursuant to a new Chapter 11 rather than conversion of
the same case to Chapter 7. While a Chapter 11 plan may seek to
liquidate a debtor's estate, a liquidating plan does not preserve jobs
and economic resources; as a justification for reshuffling creditor pri-
orities. Jartran II's revocation of earlier priorities significantly dimin-
ished the value of a claim without reference to the "purposes" and
"objectives" of the Code.
Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act recognized a priority for the nec-
essary costs and expenses of preserving the estate subsequent to filing
the petition. 37 Courts interpreting the administrative expense provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 held that these provisions, which
were very similar to those contained in the present Code, authorized
the courts to treat as administrative expenses executory contracts en-
tered into during a reorganization but before conversion to straight
bankruptcy. 38 Under the old Bankruptcy Act, courts extended broad
protections to entities that contracted with a debtor-in-possession.139
The similarity this language bears to the present Bankruptcy Code
demonstrates a Congressional, interest in protecting parties to as-
sumed executory contracts or leases, subsequently breached by a
debtor."4
This interest is evident from the Bankruptcy Code's evolution.
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1967 to mandate that the
135. In re Chugiak Boat Works, 18 B.R. 292, 295 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982).
136. Jartran, 886 F.2d 859.
137. Id.
138. Chugiak 18 B.R. at 294.
139. See In re Avorn Dress Co., 78 F.2d 681, 683 (2nd Cir. 1935) (The obligations
arising from purchases and sales made by the debtor in possession in the ordinary course
of business before conversion to straight bankruptcy constitute administrative expenses,
with no need for prior court approvals of the transactions. Where a debtor is reorganiz-
ing, a commitment made that a service is necessary for a debtor's reorganization gives the
provider of that service a priority claim under Sections 62 and 64 of the Bankruptcy
Act.). See also In re California Eastern Airways, 95 F. Supp. 348, 351 (D. Del. 1951).
140. Chugiak, 18 B.R. at 295.
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courts give assumed executory contracts an administrative priority.' 4 '
The 1967 amendment explicitly provided that any executory contract
entered into or assumed during the reorganization proceeding but re-
jected after conversion to straight bankruptcy, constituted an admin-
istrative expense of the reorganization proceeding.'42  The
amendment and its legislative history reflect a Congressional intent to
recognize the rights of parties "who have dealt with an officer of the
court in the debtor relief proceeding."' 43 By including an identical
amendment in Chapters 10, 11, and 12 of the Act, Congress expanded
this protection to creditors in all reorganizations.
In the present Bankruptcy Code, the first priority is for "adminis-
trative expense claims" allowed under section 503(b).'" This provi-
sion is an integral part of the Code's solution to the problem of getting
suppliers, customers, and others to continue to do business with a
debtor in bankruptcy. An "administrative priority" creates a right for
those whose claims arise during a bankruptcy proceeding to be paid
before the general, unsecured creditors holding prepetition claims.'45
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of section 365(g) is at odds
with this historical evolution. The legislative history does not suggest
that Congress sought to change the Code's view of administrative pri-
orities for executory contracts from the view espoused by courts
under the Act and the Act's 1967 amendment. 46 Section 365(g) of
the Bankruptcy Code together with section 503(b) cover cases where
prepetition and postpetition executory contracts are either assumed or
rejected by a debtor."" Section 365(g) continues the practice under
the Act of granting an automatic administrative expense priority to
141. Id. See also S. REPORT No. 749, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 S. Rep.
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 2002, 2005.
142. Subsection (b) of the 1967 Amendment states:
Any contract which is entered into or assumed by a debtor in possession, re-
ceiver, or trustee in a proceeding under this chapter and which is executory in
whole or in part at the time of the entry of an order directing that bankruptcy
be proceeded with shall be deemed to be rejected unless expressly assumed
within sixty days after the entry of such order or the qualification of the trustee
in bankruptcy, whichever is the later, but the court may for cause shown extend
or reduce the time. When a contract entered into or assumed in a superseded
proceeding is rejected, the resulting liability shall constitute a cost of adminis-
tration of the superseded proceeding.
Bankruptcy Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 90-157, § 2(b), 81 Stat. 511, 513 (1967).
143. Chugiak, 18 B.R. at 295 quoting S. Report No. 749, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., re-
printed in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2002, 2005.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).
145. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 3.
146. Chugiak, 18 B.R. at 295.
147. Id.
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executory contracts assumed during a reorganization which are later
rejected after conversion. 48 In addition to prepetition, "assumed" ex-
ecutory contracts, the provision applies to new contracts initially con-
ceived during the debtor's reorganization that are approved by the
bankruptcy court. 14 9 By placing a debtor's new contracts in the same
category as a debtor's postpetition assumed contracts, the present
Bankruptcy Code's protection to creditors extends even further than
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.
Commenting on the language of section 365(g), courts have con-
cluded that an administrative priority arises automatically as a credi-
tor protection. 50 By focusing on the debtor's act of assumption, the
statute indicates that this protection is not permissive, but is obliga-
tory. In permitting a debtor to file a second Chapter 11 petition, the
Seventh Circuit introduces a new priority structure that usurps the
priorities established in the first case. The Seventh Circuit's reading
of the statute gives debtors an opportunity to revoke this administra-
tive priority, making the protection permissive rather than
automatic. ''
The approach conflicts with important bankruptcy policies, evident
from other courts' interpretations of section 365(g). The Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Alaska in Chugiak Boat Works 5 2
faced a situation similar to Jartran. Chugiak involved an unsuccessful
reorganization that led to the debtor's breaching of obligations that
the court characterized as executory. 53
Chugiak Boat Works filed for Chapter 11 relief in 1980."" In the
reorganization period prior to the case's conversion, a customer made
a $4,150 down-payment on a boat to be manufactured by the debtor
in the ordinary course of its business.'55 The debtor later terminated
its business operations and breached its contract with its customer. 5 6
After an unsuccessful attempt to reorganize, the case was converted
to Chapter 7. The issue before the court was whether the obligation
to return the deposit accepted by a debtor in the course of his reorgan-
ization constitutes an administrative expense in the Chapter 7
148. Id.
149. Id. at 296-97.
150. Id. at 295.
151. In re Jartran, 886 F.2d 859, 870 (7th Cir.. 1989).
152. Chugiak, 18 B.R. at 292.
153. Id. at 293.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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liquidation.157
The court proceeded by tracing the history of section 365(g) back
to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act and concluded that the overwhelming
purpose of section 365(g) is to provide protection to creditors that
have chosen to continue business relations with a reorganizing
debtor."5 8 "The history of the bankruptcy law's treatment of execu-
tory contracts, together with the provisions of the Code,1 59 .. .compel
the conclusion that the Court is authorized to treat such obligations
as administrative expenses. ' '"") Many courts acknowledge the pur-
pose of Chapter 11 as a means of preventing those liquidations that
are avoidable, thus rehabilitating the debtor and ensuring more sub-
stantial satisfaction of creditors.' 61  ..
In contrast to Jartran, the Chugiak court construed section 365(g)
broadly to recognize the risks inherent in doing business with a reor-
ganizing debtor.1 62 Protecting these entities with administrative pri-
orities makes it palatable for a customer to make a deposit to a
company coming out of bankruptcy.1 63 As Jartran demonstrates,
consecutive Chapter 11 petitions permit a debtor to treat a customer's
deposit as a general unsecured claim against the estate. Such treat-
ment would deter suppliers, landlords, and customers from commit-
ting resources to a debtor in a reorganization.
The bankruptcy court's policy arguments in Chugiak resemble
those of Fruehauf's in Jartran: "[t]here would be little chance of at-
tracting potential customers or creditors to deal with a financially
troubled debtor if the performance of the debtor's obligations to those
entities was not somehow assured. ' 61  After Jartran's bankruptcy fil-
ing, Fruehauf placed large amounts of equipment essential to the car-
rying on of Jartran's business at risk. Fruehauf asserted that the
157. Id. at 294.
158. Id.
159. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g) and 363(c)(1).
160. Chugiak, 18 B.R. at 293.
161. Id. at 298. See also In re Heatron, Inc., 6 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
162. Chugiak, 18 B.R. at 298.
163. Id. "The policy of Congress of encouraging alternatives to liquidation bolsters
this conclusion, since the protection of potential customers of a debtor in possession is
necessary to foster a successful reorganization." Id. at 293.
164. Id. at 298. See also In re Jartran, 886 F.2d 859, 870. Fruehauf argued strenu-
ously before the Seventh Circuit and the Bankruptcy Court that a successive Chapter 11
filing for the purpose of liquidation is unfair. Id. at 870. Fruehauf's policy argument
asserted that successive filing for purposes of liquidation may discourage creditors from
agreeing to Chapter 11 arrangements in the future since this outcome in many cases
deprives creditors of protection in the event the arrangements failed. Id. The Seventh
Circuit acknowledged these arguments but concluded that the framers of the Code had
other policy concerns. Id.
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assurance of an administrative priority, if Jartran's business reorgani-
zation failed, was the primary reason they continued to conduct busi-
ness with Jartran. 65
In addition to protecting parties that contract with a reorganizing
debtor, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Iowa pro-
vided an additional rationale for a broad reading of section 365(g). 166
In Multech,167 the debtor, Multech Corporation ("Multech"), entered
into a lease in October of 1975 involving industrial property. 68 The
lease provided for a ten-year term running until November 30,
1985.169 On January 11, 1982, Multech initiated Chapter 11 proceed-
ings under the Bankruptcy Code.170 Although Multech had fallen
into arrears on its lease payments, the bankruptcy court permitted the
debtor to;assume the unexpired lease. 17 1 Multech's reorganization ul-
timately failed and performance under the assumed lease was short-
lived.' 72  Consequently, the bankruptcy court converted Multech's
Chapter 1 1 proceedings to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 173
In analyzing the question of whether costs arising from the
breached lease are entitled to an administrative priority, the Multech
court's rationale and approach is diametrically opposed to Jartran's
use of a consecutive Chapter 11. In both cases, the reorganization
failed and the remaining task for the debtor was to liquidate the es-
tate's assets.' 74 While Jartran allowed an administrative expense to
be demoted by a second Chapter 11 petition, the court's language in
Multech suggests that claims arising from leases and executory con-
tracts may never be demoted. "[I]f a lease is assumed in Chapter 11
165. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 870.
166. See In re Multech, 47 B.R. 747 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985). The court interpreted
11 U.S.C. § 3 65(g): "By defining the time at which a rejection of an assumed contract or
lease constitutes a breach, section 365(g) clearly indicates that the act of assumption cre-
ates an administrative expense obligation of the particular proceedings in which the con-
tract or lease was assumed." Id. at 750.
167. Id. at 749.
168. Id. at 748.
169. Id. at 749.
170. Id.
171. Id. II U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and (b)(1)(A) permit a debtor to assume a lease so long as
the debtor can cure defaults and provide adequate protection of future lease payments.
Multech's granting the lessor a security interest and the inclusion of a "drop dead" provi-
sion, granting lessor immediate relief from the automatic stay, should the debtor default,
were found to be adequate protection. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. ("On August 17, 1982, Multech's Chapter 11 proceedings were converted to a
Chapter 7 liquidation."). Compare In re Jartran, 886 F.2d 859, 861 (."On March 4, 1986,
the reorganized Jartran filed a second Chapter 11 petition, this time with the aim of
liquidating rather than reorganizing the company.").
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proceedings, the liabilities flowing from the rejection of that lease will
ever after be regarded as a Chapter 11 administrative expense." 175
The court defended this statement by analyzing how courts super-
vise the assumption of executory contracts and the significance of this
supervision. The court recognized that the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion creates a new juridical entity that is separate and apart from the
business entity that existed prior to bankruptcy proceedings. 76 Con-
trol is transferred to a distinct legal entity, usually the debtor-in-pos-
session, that runs the business under the supervision of the court. 77
The Multech court looked at the mechanism by which an estate as-
sumes an executory contract and argued that the act of assumption is
a transaction with the debtor-in-possession. Therefore, the debtor-in-
possession causes legally cognizable injuries and any claim arising
from those actions is entitled to priority as an administrative
expense. 178
The rationale behind this conclusion stems in part from the broad
powers that exist as part of a debtor's business judgment.' 79 These
broad powers give the debtor-in-possession the discretion to reallocate
assets, to borrow money and to enter obligations that will benefit the
reorganization. 80 The Multech court stated that the assumption of
an executory contract reflects the debtor's business judgment that
some benefit will inure to the estate and thus to unsecured creditors
from assuming this particular prepetition obligation.''
The basic conflict between the Seventh Circuit and Multech con-
cerns who should bear the cost when a debtor's business judgment
proves to be wrong. Multech provides a compelling rationale for pre-
serving the administrative priority of a claim arising from the debtor's
breach of an assumed executory contract.8 2 The court observed that
permitting the expenses that flow from a breached lease to maintain a
priority status harms unsecured creditors by the amount of the land-
175. Id. at 750.
176. Id.
177. See In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950, 954 (lst Cir. 1976).
178. Multech, 47 B.R. at 751.
179. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Govern-
ance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1,
11 (1989).
180. Id. " 'Business discretion' involves choices about the use of the existing assets and
business operations of the Chapter 11 debtor, both during and after reorganization." Id.
at 8. "Acting in the ordinary course, the debtor in possession can operate the business,
sell, use or lease assets, and obtain additional financing. There is no judicial review unless
a party in interest requests it." Id. at 12.
181. Multech, 47 B.R. at 751.
182. Id.
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lord's claim.18 3 However, the court concluded that the unsecured
creditors rather than the lessor should bear the cost because the exer-
cise of the debtor's business judgment is initially intended to benefit
all creditors. 1 4
In Jartran, an analogous situation existed. Jartran's assumption of
the lease was an exercise of the debtor's business judgement.'85 Per-
suaded by the debtor that this act would benefit the Jartran reorgani-
zation, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois
approved the assumption of the lease.' 86 Fruehauf, the lessor, bore
the risks of continuing to lease expensive equipment to a bankrupt
entity presumably under the assumption that their claim would be
satisfied before all other unsecured claims in the event Jartran's reor-
ganization failed. The Jartran decision demonstrates how consecutive
Chapter 11 petitions can allow a debtor to dispose of an administra-
tive priority claim as a general unsecured claim in contravention of
the policy of encouraging reorganizations.
The goal of Chapter 11 provides an important backdrop in deter-
mining whether a debtor has filed a Chapter 11 petition in good faith.
In an often quoted section of its legislative history, Congress defined
Chapter 1 's goals as follows:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation
case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue
to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and
produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the
industry for which they were designed are more valuable than
those same assets sold for scrap.'8 7
Because consecutive Chapter 11 petitions can compromise creditor
interests88 and can discourage creditors, like Fruehauf, from continu-
183. Id.
184. Id. at 752 (because an executory contract has been scrutinized by the court prior
to assumption, the liabilities and expenses resulting from a subsequent rejection are auto-
matically granted administrative expense priority that will not be subject to further limi-
tation by II U.S.C. § 503).
185. See Jartran, 886 F.2d 859 (Where debtor in possession assumed lease after filing
first bankruptcy petition).
186. Jartran, 71 B.R. 938, 940 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
187. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess at 220-21 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
188. See Jartran, 886 F.2d at 870. "[A]lthough the framers of the code were con-
cerned about protecting creditors, they had other policy concerns, including ration-
aliz[ing] the various forms of relief available to a failing business, making business
reorganization a quicker, more efficient procedure, and providing greater protection, for
debtors, creditors, and the public interest." Id.
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ing to do business with a bankrupt entity, their use should be limited
by a strict good faith standard. Permitting consecutive Chapter 11
petitions, especially where they circumvent Bankruptcy Code protec-
tions, cuts against the paramount Chapter 11 goal of encouraging
creditor cooperation with debtor reorganizations.
IV. The Detrimental Effect Of Consecutive Filings On Creditor
Protections
To protect creditors, the Bankruptcy Code establishes creditor rem-
edies that should apply when a debtor defaults. It is expected that
when reorganizations fail, liquidation will proceed either through
conversion to Chapter 718s9 or through liquidation in the first Chapter
11.190 By allowing a consecutive Chapter 1:1 petition, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Jartran invented a different remedy. 191 The heart of this new
remedy involves allowing a debtor.to file a second Chapter 11 petition
and to confirm a second reorganization plan.
While innovative, the approach diminishes creditor protections
provided in the Bankruptcy Code. The next section analyzes how
consecutive Chapter 11 petitions circumvent section 1127's limitation
on a debtor's ability to modify a plan and interfere with the expecta-
tion that, should a~debtor default on plan obligations, liquidation will
ensue through conversion to Chapter 7.192
A. Consecutive Filings Upset the Limitations on a Debtor's Right
to Modify a Confirmed Plan
While the Bankruptcy Code contains no explicit limitation on con-
secutive Chapter 11 petitions, the Code contains a rigid set of condi-
tions that specify when a debtor can modify or revoke a plan.193 The
189. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) permits conversion of Chapter 11 plans that cannot be effec-
tuated to Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 governs the "Effect of Confirmation" of a plan of
reorganization in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The provision binds all parties in a business
reorganization to the obligations established by the plan.
In addition to binding the parties of a bankruptcy reorganization to the plan, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(d) discharges the reorganized debtor's prepetition liabilities. The effect of a confir-
mation is to discharge the entire pre-confirmation debt, replacing it with a new indebted-
ness as provided for in the confirmed plan. Upon confirmation, the debtor holds the
property of the estate free and clear of the liens of creditors.
190. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 349 (1977).
191. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 870. (asserting that the consolidation of Chapters X and XI
(of the old Act) into Chapter.11 of the new Code, without any limitation as to consecu-
tive filings, had as its aim a more rational, .flexible method for permitting commercial
debtors to continue in business while ensuring that similarly situated creditors were
treated equitably).
192. See In re Mushroom Transp. Co., 78 B.R. 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 1127.
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Bankruptcy Code governi the modification 'of a- confirmed plan
through section 1127.194 The most important limitation prescribed by
this section establishes a threshold beyond which a "proponent" 19
will be barred from modifying a plan. 196 The right to modify a con-
firmed plan terminates when the plan is substantially consum-
mated.1 97 While. defined in the Bankruptcy Code, substantial
consummation is a bankruptcy term of art that courts define on a
case-by-case basis.1 98 To meet this requirement, some courts require
that more than half rather than a mere preponderance of the plan
must have been completed.1 99 Other courts have defined substantial
consummation as requiring completion of or near completion of
transfers of property to or. from the. debtor at or near the time the plan
is confirmed.2 ° . To protect creditors,- the possibility for altering a
plan diminishes as the debtor moves closer to fulfilling the plan.
In addition to modification, the Bankruptcy Code provides another
limited circumstance where a debtor may be able to revoke a con-
firmed plan.20 Pursuant to section 1144, a debtor may revoke an
order for relief in the event of fraud. The request must be made
194. 11 U.S.C. § 1127. The provision's subsections contain the following limitations:
Subsection (a) allows only the proponent of a plan to modify its terms. Subsection
(b) adds an important time restriction, barring proposals for modification after substan-
tial consummation. Subsection (c) requires that the modification comply with the disclo-
sure provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1125.
The legislative history adds the caveat that if the modification is sufficiently minor, the
court might determine that additional disclosure was not required under the circum-
stances.
The three subsections share the common requirement that modifications be consistent
with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122 and 1123 which govern the classification, of claims and a plan's
contents. Before this modification becomes part of the already confirmed plan, the Court
must confirm the plan as modified and the circumstances must warrant the modification.
195. A plan's "proponent" may be either a debtor or a creditor. Creditors are free to
propose reorganization plans after the debtor's 180 day exclusivity period, from the time
of filing, expires. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(C)(3).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., In re Hayball Trucking, Inc., 15 C.B.C.2d 1201 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1986).
199. See In re Jorgensen, 16 C.B.C.2d 157 (9th Cir., B.A.P., 1986).
200. See United States v. Novak, 20 C.B.C. 2d 131 (D.S.D. 1988).
201. The Bankruptcy Code provides that an order of confirmation may be revoked
under certain circumstances:
On request of a party in interest at any time before 180 days after the date of the
entry of the order of confirmation, and after notice and a hearing, the court may
revoke such order if and only if such order was procured by fraud. An order
under this section revoking an order of confirmation shall
(1) contain such provisions as are necessary to protect an entity acquiring
rights in good faith reliance on the order of confirmation; ind
(2) revoke the discharge of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1144.
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within 180 days after the date of entry.2"2 The 1984 amendment to
section 1144 changed the language to permit revocation "only" on the
basis of fraud.20 3 The amendment and the case law interpreting this
provision illustrate the narrow circumstances where bankruptcy
courts permit revocation. 2' These specific limitations in the Bank-
ruptcy Code suggest that Congress was generally adverse to a debtor's
efforts to alter a confirmed reorganization plan. Case law has con-
strued the rights arising from a court's confirmation of a debtor's plan
as binding, enabling creditors and parties to rely upon a plan's
obligations.205
Consecutive Chapter 11 petitions should not provide a means to
circumvent these rigid limitations on a debtor's right to modify a con-
summated plan. In Jartran, the debtor's consecutive filing diminished
the value of Fruehauf's Jartran I claim by lowering it to that of a
general unsecured creditor.20 6 This modification cannot be reconciled
with the Code's definition of a permissible modification or revocation.
Because the circuit court accepted the bankruptcy court's factual find-
ing that the first plan had been substantially consummated,20 7 the
Bankruptcy Code's limitation on modification would appear to apply.
To escape this requirement, the Seventh Circuit drew a distinction
that appeared to ignore the Code's explicit language, asserting that
"Jartran II is not an attempt to modify the terms of the plan, but
rather is a good faith admission that Jartran was unable to continue
operating as a going concern.''208 No provision in the Bankruptcy
Code creates an exception for "good faith admissions" that modify a
confirmed plan.2° Whether Jartran H was an "attempt to modify"
Fruehauf's claim is irrelevant. Rather than focusing on the objective
effect that flows from a debtor's action, the Seventh Circuit's standard
for modification reads an analysis of a debtor's subjective intent into
the Bankruptcy Code.
In seeking to distinguish Northampton210 and AT of Maine,21' the
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See In re D.F.D. Inc., 43 B.R. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). A creditor alleged
that the debtor obtained an order of confirmation through fraud because of the debtor's
knowing failure to list the creditor on its schedules. The court held that principles of
equity precluded the creditor from having the confirmation revoked.
205. See In re AT of Maine, 56 B.R. 55, 57; In re Northampton, 39 B.R. 955, 956.
206. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 870.
207. Id. at 868.
208. Id.
209. 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b).
210. 39 B.R. 955 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
211. 56 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985).
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Seventh Circuit asserted that Jartran did not have a conscious intent
to alter the first plan's terms.212 This subjective reading suggests that
the rights flowing from a confirmed plan are inferior to contractual
rights. To enable parties to rely on a plan's provisions, the AT of
Maine and Northampton courts invoked the Code's limitations on
modification to reject the debtors' consecutive Chapter 11 petitions.2 3
The AT of Maine court cited section 1127(b) for the proposition
that: "[t]he proponent of a plan or the reorganized debtor may modify
such plan at any time after confirmation of such plan and before sub-
stantial consummation of such plan."2 4 Unlike the Seventh Circuit,
the bankruptcy courts in the aforementioned cases perceived the
debtor's attempt to file a consecutive plan as a sub rosa means to mod-
ify obligations established in a substantially consummated plan.215
Consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's intent, these courts refused to
allow debtors to alter creditors' rights established in a confirmed
plan.2 6 AT of Maine recognized that the debtor's only motive was to
use the consecutive filing as a vehicle to protect the trust's sole benefi-
ciary from the estates of two secured creditors: MNB and SBA. 217
Similarly, the Northampton court characterized the debtor's filing of a
second Chapter 11 petition with an eye toward curing defaults arising
under a previously confirmed Chapter 11 plan as akin to modifying
the previous plan. s
Emphasizing a creditor's right to take action when a debtor
breaches a plan, A T of Maine and Northampton maintained that cred-
itors may take whatever action they are entitled to against the prop-
erty held by the trust as a result of nonpayment.219 Because the
consecutive Chapter 11 petition interfered with a creditor's remedy,
the courts labelled the debtors' consecutive filings as bad faith.220 The
Bankruptcy Code's limitations on modification and on revocation of a
confirmed plan recognize the inconvenience or prejudice that credi-
tors would suffer if a debtor had an unbridled right to modify plan
obligations. By expanding the debtor's right to alter a confirmed plan,
212. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 867-68.
213. See AT of Maine, 56 B.R. at 57; Northampton, 39 B.R. at 956.
214. ATof Maine, 56 B.R. at 56.
215. Id. at 57. ("[C]ourt found that the filing of the second petition was tantamount
to modifying the previous plan after substantial consummation in violation of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1127(b)...").
216. See ATof Maine, 56 B.R. at 57; Northampton, 39 B.R. at 956.
217. ATof Maine, 56 B.R. at 58.
218. Northampton, 39 B.R. at 956.
219. See ATof Maine, 56 B.R. at 57.
220. Id. at 58.
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the Seventh Circuit permitted a consecutive Chapter 11 to emasculate
the Bankruptcy Code's explicit limitations on modification.
B. When Allowed, Consecutive Filings Prevent a Creditor's
Remedy: Conversion to Chapter 7
Where a debtor defaults on plan obligations, the Bankruptcy Code
gives the court authority to convert the reorganization to a liquidation
under Chapter 7.221 The threshold for converting a case is relatively
low in terms of the degree of injury a creditor must sustain from a
debtor's default. Case law suggests that a bankruptcy court need not
give exhaustive reasons for its decision, to convert, against a debtor's
wishes.222 In contrast to modification, conversion remains an alterna-
tive even after substantial consummation. 223
Against this statutory scheme delineating specific rules for conver-
sion in the wake of failed reorganizations, the Seventh Circuit denied
Fruehauf the opportunity to convert Jartran I to Chapter 7.224 The
distinction between the Seventh Circuit's liquidating Chapter 11 and
conversion to Chapter 7 may seem insignificant because both accom-
plish the end of liquidation. However, section 726(a)(1) provides an
essential protection for creditors with priority claims in a Chapter 7
liquidation.
This section dictates the order in which general distribution will
occur in liquidation cases. After the trustee has reduced the estate's
property to money, the property is first distributed among priority
claimants as determined by section 507.225 Because Fruehauf's claim
arose from an assumed lease (i.e. the agreement with Jartran), Frue-
hauf's claim would have been satisfied before those of the unsecured
creditors had the Seventh Circuit followed the conventional route of
221. 11 U.S.C. §§ 11 12(b)(6)(9) provides that a court may dismiss a bankruptcy case
or convert a Chapter 11 case to a case under Chapter 7 after confirmation by reason of
the following:
(6) revocation of an order of confirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 1144 of this title,
and denial of confirmation of another plan or a modified plan under § 1129 of
this title;
(7) inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed plan;
(8) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
(9) terminatin of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in
the plan.
222. See Koerner v. Colonial Bank, 800 F.2d 1358, 1368 (5th Cir. 1986) (Court found
cause to convert simply in the debtor's inability to effectuate a plan and in unreasonable
delay, deemed prejudicial to the creditors.).
223. See 11 U.S.C. § 1127.
224. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 867-68.
225.'H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 383 (1977).
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converting to Chapter 7.226 The Seventh Circuit held this protection
to be inapplicable in a Chapter 11 liquidation.227
In denying Fruehauf its administrative priority, the Seventh Circuit
defended its position by asserting that Fruehauf should have bar-
gained for greater protections.22 s However, experts in the field have
described the universe of possible alternatives as encompassed by con-
version to Chapter 7 or liquidation within the same Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding.229 It is unreasonable to make a creditor negotiate for
protections explicitly provided in the Code. The Seventh Circuit rec-
ognized that Fruehauf acted under the assumption that it was guaran-
teed an administrative priority should the plan fail, whatever form the
liquidation would take.230  In addition, the court cited the greater
costs of administering a Chapter 7 as a second justification for a liqui-
dating, consecutive Chapter 11 petition.23 ' Aside from the obvious
cost of appointing a Chapter 7 trustee, the court does not specify what
these costs would include and why they would exceed the cost of liq-
uidating in Chapter 11.
Allowing a debtor to file a consecutive Chapter 11 petition sidesteps
priority provisions explicitly provided in the Bankruptcy Code. It is
not logical to conclude that Congress desired that the courts have
specific guidelines in a Chapter 7 conversion and complete discretion
to reestablish priorities in a consecutive Chapter 11 liquidation. 232
Congress' failure to include provisions to govern priorities in a Chap-
ter 11 liquidation suggests that Congress never intended a debtor to
use a consecutive Chapter 11 petition as a means to liquidate.233
226. See, e.g., Chugiak, 18 B.R. at 298 n. 10 ("And in the case of businesses liquidating
under Chapter 11, the policy basis is to provide for a controlled liquidation that will more
likely maximize the amount to be paid on creditors' claims than would a liquidation
under Chapter 7."). While courts advocate a liquidating Chapter 11 as a means to maxi-
mize the liquidation value of an estate through a protracted sale, the Seventh Circuit cites
no authority for placing the burden on creditors with administrative claims.
227. The Code provides for the "[d]istribution of property of the estate" as follows:
(a) Except as provided in § 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be
distributed-
(1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in the order specified
in, § 507 or this title. 11 U.S.C. § 726.
228. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 869.
229. Id. at 870 n.12.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 870.
232. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (providing that in a case which has been converted to Chap-
ter 7 proceedings, the Chapter 7 administrative expense claims have priority over any
administrative expenses incurred prior to the conversion).
233. See In re Northampton Corp., 39 B.R. 955, 956 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (filing of
second petition gives rise to an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) which barred
Hanover, the creditor, from further continuing with the foreclosure. A reimposition of
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C. A More Rigorous Good Faith Standard Should Encompass
Both a Good Faith and a Changed Circumstance
Component
The good faith analysis has been criticized as one of the "most neb-
ulous concepts in bankruptcy law. . .*234 Responding to this criti-
cism, courts have delineated factors to analyze a debtor's use of two
Chapter 11 petitions. While one standard cannot enumerate the
countless circumstances that may constitute bad faith, one bank-
ruptcy court has stated that the "real test" for good faith should man-
date that a court consider "[t]he presence of honest intention of the
debtor and some real need and real ability to effectuate the aim of the
reorganization even if this involves the total liquidation of the
assets. " 2
35
In addition to finding good faith, courts should predicate the pro-
priety of a consecutive Chapter 11 upon a finding of significant and
unanticipated changed circumstances. A number of equitable ratio-
nales support including a changed circumstance requirement. These
rationales include: frustration that creditors experience in dealing
with multiple filings, 236 the nature of the automatic stay, a desire to
prevent the relitigation of cases involving identical debtor and credi-
tor issues, and the prevention of "end-run modifications" around sub-
stantially consummated plans.237
The inclusion of a changed circumstance requirement as a neces-
sary condition for maintaining a consecutive Chapter 11 avoids the
redundancy that can occur when identical parties return to the bank-
ruptcy court after a debtor's default on a substantially consummated
plan. Recognizing the repetitive nature of consecutive filings, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California invoked a res
judicata rationale to permit a creditor's foreclosure remedy on collat-
eral whose ownership rights had been litigated in a prior Chapter 13
case. 2 38 The debtor's first plan contained a prospective order giving
the creditor an immediate right to foreclose should the debtor de-
the automatic would have inconvenienced creditors by requiring their reappearance in
court).
234. In re Garsal, 98 B.R.140, 151 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
235. In re North Redington Beach Associates, Ltd., 91 B.R. 166, 169 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1988).
236. See In re Kinney, 51 B.R. 840, 844 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985); In re Jones, 105 B.R.
1007, 1014 (N.D. Ala. 1984) ("Jones did not wait 180 days. He waited only long enough
for his lawyer to fill out a new petition... The patience of the creditor was exhausted, if
not the patience of the trustee and of the judge.").
237. Garsal, 98 B.R. at 149.
238. In re Abadul-Hasan, 104 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
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fault.2 39 The bankruptcy court held the prospective order to be en-
forceable to protect a creditor in a second filing. The holding
permitted Fireman's Fund to proceed with its foreclosure sale in spite
of the second automatic stay. Commenting on the Bankruptcy Code's
lack of explicit guidance regarding consecutive filings, the court
stated:
[T]here is no way available to prevent multiple filings and their
detrimental effect on creditors who have previously fully and fairly
litigated the automatic stay issues. The "prospective order" does
not interfere with the right of the debtor to file a bankruptcy, but
does protect the creditor from multiple delays and removes the in-
centive of the debtor to act in an abusive manner. 24 (footnote
omitted).
Applying this res judicata rationale, the court justified extending the
scope of the prospective order to protect a creditor in a consecutive
case.
24 1
A second rationale for requiring a significant change in circum-
stances focuses on the nature of the automatic stay. The automatic
stay comes into being without the debtor taking any action to prove
that he is entitled to it.24 2 Attaining bankruptcy relief involves only a
few ministerial tasks, including the paying of a $90 fee and filling out
a petition.243 Once the debtor attains bankruptcy protection, courts
are generally reluctant to give a creditor relief from the stay until it
becomes clear that the creditor has suffered detriment and that the
debtor has not been able to provide adequate protection. 2 " Conse-
quently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California
concluded that when a bankruptcy petition is filed, all of the presump-
tions weigh in favor of the debtor.245 Arguing that a debtor should be
entitled to only one presumption, not a series of new ones at the cost
of $90 each,246 courts have justified the dismissal of a debtor's consec-
utive Chapter 13 petition.
247
Finally, the nature of the "bona fide" change in circumstances re-
quired by two recent consecutive Chapter 11 decisions illustrates an
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. ("There is nothing so sacrosanct about the automatic stay that it should not be
subject to the res judicata effect given to other types of litigation.").
242. In re Jones, 105 B.R. 1007, 1013 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
243. Abadul-Hasan, 104 B.R. at 267.
244. Jones, 105 B.R. at 1013.
245. 104 B.R. at 268.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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intent to strengthen the good faith standard. In permitting a consecu-
tive Chapter 11, both the Garsal248 and Casa Loma249 courts re-
quired that the change be unforeseen and involve factors beyond the
debtor's control.2 50 A disadvantageous shift in federal law and loss
precipitated by the closing of a nearby company satisfied these re-
quirements.25' In addition, these changes could not have been antici-
pated at the time of the debtor's petition and are distinguishable from
a failure caused by mere "changed market conditions. '252 Rather
than include changed circumstances as an element of the court's gen-
eral good faith standard, the courts considered changed circum-
stances as a distinct prong in assessing the propriety of consecutive
Chapter 11 filings.
V. Conclusion
The Bankruptcy Code contains no explicit limitation on a debtor's
right to file consecutive Chapter 11 petitions. Interpretations of the
Code's good faith standard have varied between the Seventh Circuit's
liberal interpretation and the more rigorous analysis adopted in recent
decisions. Recognizing the inconsistencies between the good faith in-
terpretations, recent decisions support a consecutive Chapter 11 stan-
dard that includes a changed circumstances component as a separate
test from the more general good faith considerations.
In support of a more stringent standard, this Note has argued that
using consecutive Chapter 11 petitions in lieu of converting to Chap-
ter 7 can deprive creditors of critical protections. By analyzing the
evolution of the Bankruptcy Code's provisions for leases and assumed
contracts, this Note demonstrates that consecutive Chapter 11 peti-
tions produce results that appear inconsistent with the Code's objec-
tive of promoting reorganizations. As is clear from the recent growth
in consecutive Chapter 11 filings, debtors will continue to be attracted
to the maneuver as a means to alter plan obligations and delay credi-
tors. In Jartran, the court's decision conflicted with the expectation
that creditors who assist a debtor in its reorganization will receive
protection should the reorganization fail. Under the first reorganiza-
tion, Fruehauf's claim against Jartran, which exceeded $54 million,253
had to be satisfied as an administrative priority claim before all other
248. Garsal, 98 B.R. at 150.
.249. Casa Loma, 122 B.R. at 818.
250. Garsal, 98 B.R. at 150.
251. Id.
252. Casa Loma, 122 B.R. at 818.
253. In re Jartran, 71 B.R. 938, 940 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).
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unsecured debt. The consecutive filing transformed the priority claim
into general unsecured debt.
The Jartran decision was one of the major bankruptcy cases of the
1980's. In its wake, the decision has left significant ambiguity over
whether courts should apply a liberal or rigorous good faith standard
to consecutive filings. The result complicates the practitioner's di-
lemma regarding whether a third party should be advised to continue
business relations and commit resources to a debtor in Chapter 11.
Thus, the inclusion of a changed circumstance component will help to
clarify the nebulous good faith standard and uphold the integrity of
the Bankruptcy Code's priority system.
Jonathan Moss

